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Abstract
This study outlines a method to estimate the short run marginal cost (SRMC) for road and railway noise.
It is based on standardized calculation methods for total noise levels and monetary cost estimates from well
established evaluation methods. Here ofﬁcial calculation methods and monetary values are used for Sweden, but
the estimation method for the SRMC outlined can be directly applied using other standardized noise calculation
methods and monetary values. This implies that the current knowledge regarding the calculation of total noise
levels and the evaluation of the social cost of noise can be extended to estimate the marginal effect as well. This
is an important ﬁnding since it enables policy makers to price noise externalities in an appropriate way. Several
sensitivity tests run for the SRMC show that: (i) increasing the total trafﬁc on the infrastructure has only a minor
inﬂuence, (ii) estimates are quite sensitive to the number of exposed individuals, and (iii) to the monetary values
used. Hence, beneﬁts transfer, i.e. using monetary values elicited based on road noise for railway noise, should
be done with caution or not at all. Results also show that the use of quiet technology can have a signiﬁcant effect
on the SRMC. The fact that this model is able to differentiate not only modes of transport, but also vehicles
and even technologies is an important ﬁnding. It is essential that the noise charges give the operators the right
incentives to choose their optimal allocation.
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11 Introduction
The transportation sector provides many beneﬁts to the society. For instance it is crucial both
for business to facilitate geographical specialization and physical access to markets, and for
individuals to access labor markets, to consume many of the goods and services produced, and
to socialize. Hence, the transportation sector is important for public welfare, but many of its
activities are accompanied by negative social effects, such as the risk of fatalities and injuries,
air pollution, loss of valuable time (i.e. the problem of congestion), and noise nuisance. These
negative impacts are not marginal from a social perspective, but are signiﬁcant and can also
be the main source of these bads. For example, the transport sector is a major source of air
pollutionandadominatingoneinurbanareas, accountingformorethan20%ofgreenhousegas
emission in the USA and the European Union (EU) (OECD, 2006). In 2000 the total external
costs (excluding congestion costs) of transport for the 15 European Union (EU) member at the
time and Switzerland and Norway was estimated to be 650 billion euros, which corresponded
to 7.3% of their total GDP (OECD, 2006).
From a policy perspective these negative effects would not be problematic in the absence
of market failures. With no market failures individuals would allocate their resources such
that their individual welfare, and thus the total social welfare was maximized. The transporta-
tion sector faces several market failures, though. For instance, regarding the negative effects
mentioned above, individuals may not be well informed about their actual exposure level of,
for instance air pollution, or what the potential effect of such a pollution level is on their own
health or the environment. Besides other market failures such as monopoly powers and po-
litical intervention, the existence of externalities is probably the major market failure in the
transportation sector.
This study focuses on the problem of noise nuisance from road and railway trafﬁc. Noise
related to transportation is a considerable social problem with estimates suggesting that more
than 20% of the population within the EU are exposed to higher noise levels than are deemed
acceptable (European Commission, 1996). The largest single source is road trafﬁc, but air and
rail trafﬁc also contribute substantially (Kalivoda et al., 2003; Lundström et al., 2003; SOU,
1993). The externality of noise exposure is an obvious market failure. Holding other aspects
of the decision alternatives constant, train passengers or car drivers will base their decision on
when and where to travel on the noise level they are exposed to inside the vehicle. They are
likely to ignore the effect of their decision on others’ exposure to the noise they emit.
2TheEUhasdecidedthatinfrastructure-usechargesshouldbebasedontheshortrunmarginal
cost (SRMC) principle (European Commission, 1998) and that different externalities should
be internalized in these charges. This has the potential of mitigating the negative effects of
transportation use and making the resource allocation of the sector more efﬁcient, which is an
important policy for all externalities within the sector, but particularly so for noise pollution.
Since noise is less “visible” than congestion, air pollution or accident risk, and since there is
a relatively long time period between exposure and negative health effects, the incentives for
policy makers to address noise problems may be lower than for other problems. Moreover,
users of transportation networks, such as train companies or individual car drivers, have no
incentives to try to inﬂuence the policy makers to address the noise externality problem, since
it will increase their costs, but may not provide any beneﬁts. Thus, there is a risk that noise
is ignored. The SRMC principle forces policy makers to deal with the noise problem as well,
which is particularly important since noise annoyance is likely to increase over the years due
the to combined effect of urbanization and increased trafﬁc (Nijland et al., 2003).
The aim of this study is to design pricing models for road and railway noise based on the
marginal cost principle that not only deal with the externality problem, but are also sophisti-
cated enough to give operators of the infrastructure incentives to contribute to a more efﬁcient
resource allocation. Regarding the latter, we develop models which estimate the marginal so-
cial cost on the vehicle level. This article draws on previous ﬁndings in Andersson and Ögren
(2007, 2010) on the development of the pricing model but improves the analysis in several as-
pects. One important aspect is that the differences in how to estimate the marginal acoustical
effects of road and rail trafﬁc is thoroughly developed and described. A major contribution of
this paper is the sensitivity analysis in which several important parameters of the models are
varied, for instance total trafﬁc volume. This analysis provides important insight into when
the estimates of the SRMC need to be adjusted based on changes of the levels of the param-
eters Moreover, previous studies were based on beneﬁt measures of noise abatement, which
were missing for rail noise and have been questioned for road noise (Andersson et al., 2010a).
As a consequence, beneﬁt measures based on road noise were used, with or without adjust-
ments, for rail trafﬁc as well. It is, however, well known that individuals’ annoyance with
road and rail trafﬁc differs and so does their WTP to reduce their exposure to the two sources
(Miedema and Oudshoorn, 2001; Day et al., 2007; Andersson et al., 2010b). Beneﬁt measures
are not often available for all noise sources and we, therefore, also conduct a sensitivity analy-
sis to examine the effect of using road trafﬁc noise beneﬁt measures for rail trafﬁc. Hence, the
3objectives of the article are threefold: (i) to design noise pricing models based on the marginal
cost principle, (ii) to outline how to calculate the marginal acoustical effects of road and rail
trafﬁcnoise, and(iii)conductseveralsensitivitytests. Inordertoconducttheempiricalanalysis
we use Swedish data.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy describe the motivation of the
marginal cost principle and derive our theoretical model. We thereafter explain and present the
most common noise indicators and describe how the marginal acoustical effects of road and rail
trafﬁc are estimated. Sections 4 and 5 contain our empirical results and sensitivity analyses.
We then discuss our results and relate them to other ﬁndings in the literature, and offer some
concluding remarks in section 6.
2 Internalizing the external cost
The EU decision to base infrastructure user charges on the social marginal cost principle
(European Commission, 1998) is based on Pigou (1920)’s work on externalities. Since many
of the activities within the transportation sector produce negative externalities, these external-
ities should be priced to prevent social excessive consumption. This is illustrated in Figure 1
where Q, D, and MCi; i = fp;sg, denote trafﬁc volume, the demand function, which reﬂects
the marginal beneﬁt (MB), and marginal cost functions, respectively. In the absence of exter-
nalities, Qp would be the optimal market equilibrium. However, the presence of a negative
externality will mean that the true social marginal cost (MCs) is higher than the one that indi-
viduals face and base their decisions on (MCp). The difference between the two curves reﬂects
the size of the externality measured in monetary terms, MEC, and to reach the optimal equi-
librium, Q
s, a user charge of t is required; that is, the difference in optimum between MCs
and MCp. This internalization will result in the maximization of social surplus in the market in
which it is applied.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Implementation of a pricing scheme for infrastructure use may have several objectives.
Above, we have shown that internalizing the external costs results in an efﬁcient allocation
of resources in the transportation sector. Other objectives could be the generation of revenues
to ﬁnance infrastructure investments, fairness, i.e. a polluter pays principle, or broader welfare
efﬁciency. As the aim of this study is to developed a model for estimating the SRMC from road
and rail trafﬁc, we do not address and discuss the different motives of “infrastructure pricing”
4or the conﬂict between the marginal social cost principle and long-run incremental costs (see,
e.g., Nash, 2005; Rothengatter, 2003; Sansom et al., 2001).
We deﬁne the SRMC of being exposed to road noise as the marginal social cost of one
extra vehicle. Our model makes a distinction between types of vehicles, for instance cars or
trucks, and between different technologies, for instance different types of breaks. However, in
this section we outline our model in general form and keep other effects besides noise from
changes in trafﬁc volumes as constant. Let L(Q;r;X) denote the noise level which is assumed
to be a function of the trafﬁc volume (Q), distance to the noise emission source (r), and a vector
of other factors assumed to inﬂuence the noise level (X), e.g. trafﬁc composition, presence of
barriers, meteorological effects and ground properties. Moreover, let C(L(Q;r;X)) and n(r)
denote the individual cost function from noise exposure and the density of exposed individuals


















Equation (2) shows the theoretically correct expression for the SRMC. However, as dis-
cussed in Andersson and Ögren (2007, 2010) a ﬁrst step to transform the model from a theo-
retical one to one that can be implemented is to acknowledge that data are usually available in
discrete and not continuous form. That is, available data on noise levels and exposed individu-
als are constant within speciﬁc intervals (i). Moreover, Eq. (2) can be seen as the change in the
total social cost for a unity change in the trafﬁc volume, i.e. DQ = 1. Let the change in noise





where c(L()) = ¶C(L())=¶L. The ﬁnal step is to deﬁne the number of exposed to the noise
level L. Let N(L) denote this number, corresponding to n(r)Dr in Eq. (3), and the noise charge




To distinguish this equation from other cost measures in this paper we refer to T in Eq. (4) as
the noise tariff.
53 Noise indicators and emitters
Noise is normally measured as an A-weighted equivalent sound pressure level during a 24 hour
(h) period with the unit dB, here denoted LAEq;24h. For sleep disturbance the maximum level
and number of events during the night is more relevant, but it is a difﬁcult indicator to use
for marginal cost calculations since only the loudest events contribute and the measure is two
dimensional(bothlevelandnumberofoccurrences). Theequivalentlevelmayalsobeweighted
according to when the noise event occurred, and in the EU a common noise indicator is LDEN
(from level day-evening-night), where nighttime events are treated as 10 dB louder and evening
events as 5 dB louder than what they actually are.1 The LDEN is always higher than the LAEq;24h
except if there are no events during the evening or night. If so, there would be no events to
punish with 5 or 10 dB, and LAEq;24h and LDEN become equal.
Swedish authorities usually use the standardized Nordic prediction methods for noise from
road and railway trafﬁc (Jonasson and Nielsen, 1996; Ringheim, 1996), for urban and infras-
tructure planning, noise mitigation measure planning, etc. Similar ofﬁcial methods exist for
manycountries, andtherearealsointernationalmethodssuchasHARMONOISE(de Vos et al.,
2005) available. Since the Nordic method is used by the Swedish authorities, we also use it in
this study. We have used it to calculate the acoustic source strength as the Sound Exposure
Level (SEL). When comparing noise events and their contribution to the equivalent level dur-
ing 24 h, it is convenient to use the SEL of the event, denoted LAE. Short and loud events such
as a car passing by at high speed can then be compared to more elongated events such as a slow
and long freight train passing by. If the SEL of the two example events are the same, then their
contribution to the overall equivalent level is the same.2
4 Empirical estimates
The empirical application of our model is based on data from Lerum, a municipality close
to Gothenburg in the south-west of Sweden, located along the motorway (E20) and the main
railway line (Västra stambanan) that connect Gothenburg and Stockholm. The data on Lerum
that we use originate from two sources; the main source is Öhrström et al. (2005) in which
health effects and annoyance from noise exposure were examined, and the other source is
data from the National Land Survey of Sweden. The latter source contains property prices







2For a more comprehensive description of the SEL, see e.g. Fahy and Walker (1998).
6and attributes and is used for the monetary evaluation of noise presented in section 4.3. It is
the ofﬁcial registry used by the Swedish authorities for property taxation. The main source,
i.e. Öhrström et al. (2005), is the one that provides us with information about noise levels and
number of exposed individuals.
Based on calculations using the Nordic method of road and rail trafﬁc noise levels for more
than 24,000 inhabitants, Öhrström et al. (2005) chose a subset of the municipality around the
railwayandmotorwayforfurtherinvestigation. ThisareaisillustratedinFigure2. Öhrström et al.
distributed 2,751 questionnaires in this area with a return rate of 71%, i.e. 1,953 households an-
swered the survey. In our study we use information from the survey about household size and
the total number of exposed dwellings to estimate the total number of exposed. For those who
answered the questionnaire, a reﬁned set of calculations of LAEq;24h and Lden noise levels of
the road and railway trafﬁc was carried out, and it is these values that are used in our study.
Thus, road and railway noise levels are calculated on property level, which means that we have
unusually rich data on noise levels. It should be noted, though, that non-responding households
have been excluded from our analysis, since less information on noise exposure is available for
them, and therefore the number of exposed is underestimated. This has an effect on the level of
the tariffs estimated in this study, but not on the main objectives, i.e. developing and describing
the model of noise tariffs and the sensitivity analysis.
4.1 Trafﬁc situation
The trafﬁc is concentrated to the two main transport routes through the area, the motorway
E20 and the railway. Trafﬁc ﬂows were around 19,000 road vehicles (9% heavy vehicles) and
190 train passages per day at the time of the survey (Öhrström et al., 2005). The railway line
transports both passenger and freight, 42 of the total are freight train passages. Approximately
half of the freight trafﬁc occurs at night (22–06). In a Swedish context the trafﬁc volumes on
both road and railway are high but not extreme.
The two transport routes are illustrated in Figure 2. In some parts of the area the railway
and motorway are located close together, and in other areas they are more distant from each
other. Also note that the railway route is slightly longer. The areas marked as urbanized in
Figure 2 contain a majority of the exposed buildings, but there are buildings throughout the
whole research area.
[Figure 2 about here.]
74.2 Acoustic differences
Comparing the SEL of two noise sources shows their relative contributions to the total noise
level from all sources. In Table 1 we show the SEL calculated at a distance of 10 meters (m)
from the emission source, denoted LAE;10m, for different vehicle types. The SEL at 10 meters
is also given per metric ton or passenger by evenly distributing the noise over the full freight or
passenger count.3
The vehicles types shown in Table 1 are the ones used for the SRMC calculations, and the
vehicles that we have chosen are for passenger transport; a car with four passengers and a bus
with 50 passengers. These are compared to three train sets, one high speed train set denoted X2
(200 km/h) for regional transport and two electric multiple units (EMU) for commuter service,
X14 and X60. The train set X60 is a newer construction which has been in service just a few
years and has lower acoustic emissions.4 Note that the rail vehicles are limited to speeds below
135 km/h in the research area, but can travel faster. Increasing speed to the maximum increases
the SEL per vehicle and passenger by about 1.5 dB for the commuter trains and about 3.5 dB
for the high speed train.
For freight transport we have chosen a fully loaded 60 ton truck, with approximately 42
metric tons as payload, and a 500 m long freight train with 1500 tons of freight (using an
electric locomotive of the Swedish Rc type). To examine the effect of using quieter technology
we have also introduced low noise versions of the vehicles by equipping them with of-the-
shelf low-noise technology. For the truck we assume an overall reduction of 5 dB, which
is achievable mainly by using low-noise tires (Sandberg and Ejsmont, 2002). In the railway
example we assume a retroﬁtting of the brakes from traditional cast iron to K-blocks, which on
average lower the sound level by 8 dB according to the International Union of Railways (UIC)
(Oertli and Hübner, 2010). Note that the noise reduction is for constant speed, i.e. it is not
related to the noise radiated while braking. Using K-blocks causes less wheel corrugation
compared to traditional brake blocks while braking, which in turn lowers the emissions during
normal rolling conditions.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 shows that the railway vehicles are typically more noisy than the road vehicles. This
is an effect of larger vehicles and that the railway vehicles in some cases also travel faster than
3For a short discussion on typical load factors and occupancy rates see Section 4.4.
4For a description of the different train sets mentioned in this article see, e.g., Diehl and Nilsson (2009)
8the road vehicles. The railway vehicles also transport more passengers and freight per vehicle,
and by examining the SEL per unit of transported passenger or freight, we ﬁnd that, whereas it
varies for passenger trafﬁc, the freight trains are still more noisy than the trucks. It is important
to remember though that these calculations are for typical vehicles, individual vehicles (espe-
cially trucks and freight trains) may vary a lot compared to these averages. Moreover, Table 1
also reveals that the potential for improvement in noise levels is higher for railway than for road
vehicles, since as much as 8 dB reduction is available by retroﬁtting brake systems.
4.3 Monetary values
As our measure of individuals’ preferences for reducing noise levels we use estimates from
a Swedish hedonic price study (Andersson et al., 2010b). In Andersson et al. (2010b) house-
owners’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a quieter living was estimated using the pooled data
set consisting of Öhrström et al. (2005), which provides the noise levels of each property, and
the National Land Survey of Sweden, which provides property prices and attributes. Since the
results of the hedonic price study and conversion of its values to beneﬁt measures for policy use
have been reported in Andersson et al. (2010b) and Andersson et al. (2010a), we only provide
a terse summary of the results in this paper.
The hedonic regression technique assumes that property prices are a function of the different
utility-bearing attributes of the property, and, by studying the price variation due to variation in
the composition of attributes implicit prices of the different attributes can be estimated (Rosen,
1974).5 The hedonic price equation used to estimate marginal WTP in this study is based on

















The noise variables are given by Lij with subscript i and j denoting single properties and road
(1) and rail (2), respectively. Other property attributes besides the noise variables are given by
5Formally, let P and A = [a1;:::;an] denote the price and the vector of attributes of a property; then the hedonic price method suggests that
P = P(A);





The hedonic method is already well documented and well known to many readers of this journal. We therefore choose not to describe the
method in detail, but instead refer the readers not well acquainted with the method to the original source Rosen (1974), or Freeman (2003).
9aih, and g, b, and k are the parameters to be estimated. Descriptions and summary statistics
of the different variables can be found in Table 8 in the appendix. In Eq. (6) the parameter
b corresponds to the maximum effect at the highest noise level 75 dB in the study area and k
describes the concavity of the function. In the regression, the parameter k is restricted to being




thus c is the parameter that is estimated in the regression. Note that b and k are estimated
separately for road and rail noise. Hence, Eq. (5) makes it possible to assume not only different
maximum effects of road and rail noise, but also different degrees of concavity for the two
noise sources. Moreover, to get a more homogeneous sample only properties with a total noise
level of at least 50 dB, i.e. the ofﬁcial Swedish threshold value for when noise is assumed to be
disturbing, are included.6
The regression results are shown in Table 2. We have also included the estimates of the
“noise sensitivity depreciation index” (NSDI), which has evolved as the standard measure of
the WTP in the hedonic noise literature.7 Focusing ﬁrst on the hedonic regression, which is
based on non-linear estimation, we ﬁnd that: (i) other property attributes besides the noise
attributes are all statistically signiﬁcant and with the expected signs, (ii) some of the neighbor-
hood dummies are signiﬁcant compared to the reference group (Floda 2), (iii) after controlling
for the noise levels, the prices of properties within 150 meters from the motorway E20 are not
signiﬁcantly affected by the motorway, and (iv) the distance variables to train stations and mo-
torway entrance, Dist. station and Dist. entrance, are not statistically signiﬁcant in the regres-
sion. Now, focusing on the variables of our main interest, the two noise variables, the relevant
hypothesis-testing is to test whether the b coefﬁcient is equal to one, since bj = 1 suggests
that the price is not inﬂuenced by the noise level. We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient for road noise is
statistically signiﬁcantly different from one, but not for railway noise. For the k-parameter, cal-
culated using the coefﬁcient estimate of cj (see Eq. (7)), a higher value implies a more concave
function, and a value close to zero implies an almost linear relationship between the noise level






where Lj; j 2 f1;2g, as before, represents the equivalent noise level in dB from road (1) and rail (2) trafﬁc noise, respectively.
7Let P and L denote property prices and noise level, respectively; then the NSDI is given by
NSDI =
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Thus, the NSDI is a measure of the percentage change in the price as a result of a unit change in the noise level (Nelson, 1980).
10and the property price. The results, therefore, suggest a more concave relationship for rail than
road noise. This is also reﬂected in the NSDI values where the effect of rail noise on property
prices is lower than the effect of road noise for all noise levels except the highest (70 dB). These
estimates lie in the upper end of the interval found for NSDI values in the literature, and for the
higher noise levels our estimates exceed those values (e.g. Bateman et al., 2001; Nelson, 2008).
Note, though, that most studies, as a result of the functional form chosen for the hedonic price
function (i.e. a semi-logarithmic function) in their studies, have estimated a constant NSDI.
Hence, those studies have ignored that the NSDI may vary with the baseline noise level.8
[Table 2 about here.]
The marginal implicit price based on the hedonic price equation in Eq. (5) is given by,
















and where prim denotes the ﬁrst derivative. Marginal WTP is evaluated for each noise source
based on the mean value of the other variables and Eq. (8) may therefore be written as:
pi = bj f0(Li); (11)
where bj is a constant and where the subscript j denotes that b varies between the noise vari-
ables.
The hedonic price regression provides us with the present value of the price variation. This
should be converted into an annual beneﬁt measure, both for the purpose of this paper and for
use in beneﬁt cost analysis (BCA). We also need to take into account tax effects, since failing
to do so would underestimate the welfare effect (Niskanen and Hanke, 1977). Moreover, we
also need to consider that the revealed WTP represents household WTP, not individual WTP.





8The preferred functional form in this study was chosen based on the results in Andersson et al. (2010b) in combination with evidence
from the acoustical literature. However, the semi-logarithmic functional form was also used in Andersson et al. (2010b) and their results
suggested that road and railway noise both had a signiﬁcant negative effect on the property prices, with the effect from road noise being
stronger. Estimated NSDI was 1.15 and 0.34 for road and railway noise, respectively.
11where r, t, and n denote the real discount rate, the property tax, and the number of household
members, respectively. The equation assumes eternal life of the property and the property tax
is multiplied by l, which denotes the proportion of the property value that is taxed in Sweden.
The property tax at the time of the survey was 1% in Sweden and data from Lerum showed that
the tax, on average was based on 50% of the value of the property, i.e. t = 0:01 and l = 0:5.
The Swedish property tax at the time of the survey was 1% which on average was based on 50%
of the market value of the properties in Lerum, i.e. t = 0:01 and l = 0:5.9 The discount rate is
based on the ofﬁcial Swedish rate proposed for BCA in the transport sector (SIKA, 2008), i.e.
r =0:04, whereas number of household members is based on the information in Öhrström et al.
(2005), n = 2:8.10
Since the wealth level in Lerum is higher compared with the average level in Sweden,
Andersson et al. (2010a) also suggested that the monetary estimates should be adjusted ac-
cording to this difference before being used for Swedish policy purposes. LetYS andYL denote
mean income for Sweden and Lerum, respectively, and q the income elasticities for the WTP














where the equation is multiplied by  1 to give a positive value. Based on empirical evidence,
we follow Nellthorp et al. (2007) and let the income elasticity be equal to q = 1. Hence, the
marginal WTP is given by multiplying Eq. (12) by the actual quotient between the average
incomes for Sweden and Lerum, which, for the age group 20 and over, was 0.875 during the
data period (www.ssd.scb.se, 2008-11-19).
Another issue is whether estimated WTP from hedonic property studies reﬂects the total
social cost of noise exposure. It has been argued that WTP estimates from these kinds of
studies should be augmented by a value reﬂecting health costs, which are assumed not be
known and/or considered by the property owners. The evidence is weak and we therefore base
our estimations on the values derived from the hedonic price function without a health cost
component. However, in our sensitivity analysis in the next section we show the effect on the
tariffs from including the health component. The health cost component (H(Li)) was estimated
to be SEK 74.2 per dB for levels above 53 LAEq;24h and 0 below that level in Andersson et al.
(2010a). The estimation of the annual social cost per person in the case of a change in level
9The point of departure is that the taxation should be based on 75% of the market value (SFS, 2001).
10Andersson et al. (2010a) examined the effect of discount rate chosen and showed that the difference in estimates was not negligible.
12from l0 to l00 can then be estimated by,
C(Li) =
∫ l00
l0 [B(Li)+H(Li)]dL; l0  50; (14)
where B(Li) is given by Eq. (13). As the threshold value for when noise is regarded as dis-
turbing is set at 50 dB in Sweden (SIKA, 2008), our estimations are also based on this value.
Equation (14) includes H(Li) to show how the two cost component should be combined to esti-
mate the total social cost, if we assume that the estimated WTP does not reﬂect the total social
cost. Therefore, by simply dropping H(Li) from the equation, we can estimate the total social
cost under the assumption that WTP does indeed reﬂect the total social cost. Table 3 shows the
constants from Eqs. (10) and (13) and examples of welfare estimates. In the next section, as
described, we have H(Li) = 0 8 LAEq;24h.
[Table 3 about here.]
4.4 Estimation of noise tariffs for road and railway trafﬁc
The model for estimating the SRMC of a single vehicle passage is outlined in Eq. (4) and
the empirical application along a certain route can be seen as a three-step process. First a
noise map is created where the noise is predicted in the surrounding landscape using the trafﬁc
volume as input (L() in Eq. (4)). Then, for each inhabitant in the exposed area the marginal
acoustical contribution of the vehicle under study must be calculated (DL in Eq. (4)). Finally
all contributions must be summed up (over N(L) exposed inhabitants) as the product of the
marginal cost function c(L()) and the marginal acoustical contribution DL.
For the noise maps we use, as previously explained, the values from Öhrström et al. (2005),
which were calculated using the standardized Nordic methods (introduced in section 3) for
road and railway noise prediction. The same methods are also used to calculate the acoustical
contribution of the marginal vehicle, i.e. DL. The calculation of the noise maps for railway
noise is straightforward since we usually, as is the case in this study, only have one source of
emission, i.e. one railway line, contributing to the level. Noise maps for road trafﬁc, however,
are usually calculated based on the trafﬁc of not only one route but all roads in a certain area.
This is the relevant noise map for the estimation of the total social cost of road noise in the
whole area, but it is not what we need for the estimation of the marginal effect of following a
single route. The best approach would be to make a new noise map using only the infrastructure
understudyasanoisesource, i.e.anoisemapfortheprimarysourcealongthepaththemarginal
13vehicle will follow. If that is not possible, it may be feasible to start from a normal noise map
with all roads present, and exclude areas that are inﬂuenced by secondary roads.
The effect of secondary roads is illustrated in Figure 3, where the noise is displayed as
contours of equal noise level for a simple ﬂat landscape with one primary and one secondary
road with less trafﬁc. If we increase the trafﬁc at the primary road, the sound level at position
A will increase (as illustrated by the moving of the contour line), but at position B it will hardly
increase at all. Therefore, it is important to calculate the marginal change including the effects
of secondary sources for receiver positions where both the main and secondary roads make a
substantial contribution to the sound level. A rule of thumb is that if the sound level from the
secondary source is within 3 dB of the total level, then the secondary source can be regarded
as dominant. In the Lerum example it was possible to identify and remove the approximately
10%ofthepopulationwhowereprimarilyexposedtonoisefromsecondaryroads.11 Removing
those inhabitants exposed to secondary sources leads to an underestimation of the SRMC, since
the presence of a secondary source does not completely eliminate the WTP. Even when the
noise from the secondary source is 10 dB louder than the noise from the primary source, the
primary source is still audible. However, it is a reasonable assumption since a renewed noise
calculation effort would be expensive and there is already data available for the total noise
situation.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Regarding the calculation of the acoustical marginal effect Andersson and Ögren (2010)
showed that DL is to a close approximation constant over the large area if one noise source
is dominant. Table 4 shows the estimates from their calculation, which where based on the
HARMONOISE (de Vos et al., 2005). Their estimates were based on road trafﬁc and the results
showed that whereas the total noise level depended on the total trafﬁc volume, the increase was
close to 1 dB over the estimated range. Thus, the change in noise level does not depend on
distance, and this simpliﬁes the calculation of the marginal change. However, the total noise
level must still be calculated for the total trafﬁc in all interesting receiver positions in order to
calculate c(L()).
[Table 4 about here.]
To calculate the acoustical contribution of the marginal vehicle, i.e. DL, for the different
vehicle types we use the standardized Nordic methods to calculate the SEL of a single vehicle
11For details see Andersson and Ögren (2010).
14passage at a reference distance from the source of 10 meters (denoted LAE;10m), which is a
standard part of the methods and different values for different vehicles and speeds are listed in
tables. The acoustical marginal effect can then be calculated as




where LAE;tot;10m is the SEL of the total noise from all trafﬁc at a distance of 10 m. This in turn
can be calculated from the equivalent level LAEq;24h(calculated at a receiver point 10 meters
from the source) using
LAE;tot;10m = LAEq;24h+10 log(86400); (16)
where the constant 86,400 is the number of seconds during 24 hours. The marginal effect DL
is typically very small, in the range of 1–0.001 dB. It is not negligible, however, since it is
multiplied by the valuation in SEK per person and year and then summed up over all exposed
inhabitants.
In order to compare the SRMC of the road and railway trafﬁc it is assumed that both occupy
the same corridor through the area and expose an equal amount of inhabitants to the same noise
level. In reality it is also important ascertain if there is a systematic difference in the population
distribution around railways as opposed to roads, and possibly also systematic differences in
acoustical properties such as screening by terrain and buildings, but this is not investigated
further here. It is also assumed that the total noise load over the area is the same, which would
correspond to a slightly increased railway trafﬁc volume compared to the real situation.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the railway and motorway partly occupy different corridors
through Lerum, and in order not to make the comparison between them cluttered by the details
of the geography, we use the motorway corridor for both transport modes when calculating the
number of exposed inhabitants. Using the railway corridor reduce the number of exposed by
about 17%, but not the shape of the distribution shown below, i.e. a function estimated from
the population exposed to railway noise would have much the same shape as the function in
Figure 4, which is explained below.
Inordertosimplifythesensitivityanalysisinthefollowingsectionthenumberofinhabitants
exposed at different equivalent levels along the road corridor is sorted into 1 dB intervals, and
a simple function is ﬁtted to the data using the least squares method. The functional form of
the population distribution then becomes
N(L) = 10 0:102L+8:20; L  50; (17)
15where N is the predicted number of exposed inhabitants and L the equivalent noise level
(LAEq;24h). This function is then divided into 1 dB intervals, following the discussion in sec-
tion 2 about discrete information on the number of exposed, and is plotted together with the
original data in Figure 4. Using this simpliﬁed population distribution gives an error of less
than 5% on the calculated SRMC. Note that it is important not to use this function to estimate
the number of inhabitants at very low levels since it grows very rapidly as the level decreases,
hence the limitation to equivalent levels of 50 dB or higher.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The estimates of the noise tariffs that reﬂect the SRMC are shown in Table 5. Tariffs are
estimated for the vehicles presented in section 3 and the upper and lower parts of the table
show the estimates for the passenger and freight trafﬁc, respectively.12 In order to calculate
the SRMC per passenger and per metric ton (1000 kg) of cargo, it is assumed that the vehicles
are ﬁlled to their maximum capacity. In the EU the actual passenger occupancy rate is about
20–40% for long distance bus travel and 25–50% for railway travel, and the typical load factor
for both road and railway freight is 40–60% (EEA, 2010, TERM 029 and 030 indicators).
Our assumption facilitates calculations and has negligible effects on the relationships shown in
Table 5.
[Table 5 about here.]
For passenger trafﬁc we ﬁnd that the SRMC for railway trafﬁc, with the exception of X60
EMU, is higher than for road trafﬁc. This would suggest higher noise tariffs for railway than
for road trafﬁc if they were to reﬂect the SRMC. However, when comparing the SRMC per
passenger, it is in general lower for rail transport. This is explained partly by lower noise
emissions per passenger for the rail vehicles (as discussed in section 4.2) and partly by the
lower valuation for the cost of noise from railways. As an example, a comparison between
bus transport and the X14 commuter train shows that they have approximately the same noise
emissions per passenger, but lower SRMC per passenger for the X14 due to the differences in
valuation function for road and rail.
We ﬁnd similar results for freight trafﬁc, i.e. higher on vehicle level and lower per metric ton
for railway compared with road trafﬁc. To illustrate the effect of using low-noise technology
the same two examples as in section 3 are included. The low noise truck is assumed to be
12Swedish trucks are allowed a maximum total weight of approximately 60 tons over much of the Swedish road network, which is why the
mass of the freight seems high in an EU perspective.
165 dB quieter than the average truck, which can be achieved mainly by using low noise tires
and effective noise mufﬂers (Sandberg and Ejsmont, 2002). For the rail example, an identical
train as the reference is assumed, except that the brakes have been retroﬁtted with K-blocks,
a measure that on average reduces the noise by 8 dB according to UIC (Oertli and Hübner,
2010) by making the wheels smoother and thereby reducing the rolling noise. In both cases the
economic incentive to reduce the noise emission is strong, if it is available within a hypothetical
noise charging system.
5 Sensitivity of tariffs due to changes in parameter levels
In order to explainwhich parameters inﬂuence the SRMC, results from a sensitivity analysis are
presented in Tables 6 and 7. By examining which parameters inﬂuence the SRMC, we obtain
information about whether adjustments of the tariffs are necessary when the corresponding
parameter varies. To illustrate the effect, we have chosen the truck and the freight train with
the same parameters as in Table 5 in the previous section as our reference cases, and then
varied the parameters within 50% or 1.8dB. The results in Table 6 are for freight trafﬁc, but
the results are close to identical for passenger transport (which therefore are omitted here but
available upon request from the authors).
The ﬁrst part of Table 5 shows the effect of a change in trafﬁc volume. Estimating tariffs
that should reﬂect the SRMC, a change of 10% in the trafﬁc volume is of main interest (since
larger changes may require changes to the infrastructure). The results show that changes in
the total trafﬁc volume only have a minor inﬂuence on the SRMC. This is a result of two
opposite effects; the monetary values and the number of inhabitants exposed to high noise
levels increase if the total trafﬁc volume increases, but the marginal acoustical contribution of
a single vehicle decreases. This insensitivity is not only the case for the smaller changes in the
total trafﬁc volume, but also for larger ones; an increase in the total trafﬁc volume of 50% will
only increase the SRMC by about 1%.
[Table 6 about here.]
The second and the third parts of Table 5 show the effect of changing the noise level of the
marginal vehicle and of the whole ﬂeet (including the marginal vehicle). Changing the noise
level of only the marginal vehicle itself has the expected effect; i.e. it is in line with the results
in Table 5 of using “quiet technology”.13 Manipulating the noise emissions of the whole ﬂeet
13A change of +0.4 dB corresponds to increasing the radiated sound power measured in Watts by 10% (+1.0 dB to 25% and +1.8 dB to
17is slightly more complex, since this also affects the number of exposed at different levels. The
effect of changing the noise level of the whole ﬂeet will therefore be larger compared with
changing it only for the marginal vehicle. Finally, it is evident that variation in population
density has a strong inﬂuence on the SRMC.
In Table 7 we show the results of a sensitivity analysis on the assumption about the monetary
values used to calculate the SRMC. Again we use the truck and freight train as our examples
andthereferencecaseisthevaluesforthesevehiclesfromTable5. Westartbyinvestigatingthe
effect of including the health component in Eq. (14). The effect on the estimates is substantially
higher for the railway estimates; railway estimates increase by 87% compared with 11% for the
road estimates. This is explained by the fact that the health component has a larger inﬂuence at
low noise levels for railway noise as shown in Table 3. Since most individuals are exposed to
low noise levels, this will inﬂuence the estimates.
The second analysis is done by interchanging the monetary values of the two noise sources,
i.e. road is treated as railway and the other way around. Due to the difference in the effect
on the property prices of the two noise sources, interchanging the preferences also has large
effects.
Finally, we also examine the effect of using the ofﬁcial Swedish monetary noise values for
beneﬁt-cost analysis (BCA), denoted ASEK 4 (SIKA, 2008). The ofﬁcial Swedish values are
basedonindividuals’preferencesforreducingroadnoiseandwereusedinAndersson and Ögren
(2007, 2010). Thus, the estimates in Andersson and Ögren (2007) for railway noise were based
on preferences for road noise. They also estimated the SRMC using the 5 dB railway bonus,
a bonus commonly used to take into account the fact that individuals are less annoyed by rail-
way than by road noise. The results suggest that using the monetary values for road noise when
estimating the SRMC for railway noise will overestimate the SRMC compared with when mon-
etary values for railway noise are used. The estimates are more than seven times higher SRMC
for the freight train and even if the introduction of the railway bonus of 5 dB lowers the SRMC,
it is still about twice as high as the values shown in Table 5.
[Table 7 about here.]
50%).
186 Discussion
In this study we have described how to estimate the SRMC for road and railway noise. The
estimation method that has been outlined is based on standardized calculation methods for total
noise levels and monetary cost estimates from well established evaluation methods. We have
used ofﬁcial calculation methods and monetary values for Sweden, but the estimation method
for the SRMC can be directly applied using other standardized noise calculation methods and
monetary values. Hence, this study has shown that the method already available for the cal-
culation of total noise levels and the evaluation of the social cost of noise can be extended to
estimate the marginal effect as well. This is an important ﬁnding since it enables policy makers
to price noise externalities in an appropriate way. The EU has decided that infrastructure-user
charges should be based on the SRMC principle (European Commission, 1998). It is important
that these estimates are based on solid calculation methods and that the estimation of the SRMC
is transparent. The estimation method in this study takes both of these into account.
For the objective of this study, the absolute level of the estimated SRMC is of limited in-
terest. As described, the data on number of exposed from Öhrström et al. (2005) provide an
underestimation of the actual number, and we also choose not to include a health cost compo-
nent in our estimates, since the evidence that this is not already included in the WTP estimates
is weak (Andersson et al., 2010a). Thus, our estimates can be seen as a conservative estimate
of the true social marginal cost for an area like Lerum. Moreover, the levels of the estimates
are only relevant for areas such as Lerum since they depend on the actual trafﬁc situation
and the distribution of the number exposed. For instance, Lerum is relative densely popu-
lated for Sweden and the SRMC would, therefore, be lower for many other areas in Sweden
(Andersson and Ögren, 2010). Previous research has also shown the sensitivity of the chosen
threshold level (Andersson and Ögren, 2007, 2010). In this study we have chosen the Swedish
ofﬁcial level of 50 dB, whereas many other countries use 55 dB as their threshold level.
The objective of this study is, however, to outline a model to estimate the SRMC of road
and railway noise and to examine its sensitivity to different aspects concerning trafﬁc situation,
quiet technology and preferences for quiet (i.e. monetary values used). Regarding the sensitiv-
ity, we ﬁnd that increasing the total trafﬁc volume has only a minor inﬂuence on the estimated
marginal cost, since the total noise exposure increases and the marginal WTP is higher, but the
marginal acoustical contribution of each vehicle decreases. Therefore, charges based on the
SRMC are relatively stable when the trafﬁc volume changes. The SRMC is, however, quite
19sensitive to the number exposed and to the monetary values used. The latter suggest that bene-
ﬁts transfer, i.e. using monetary values that are based on road noise for railway noise, should be
done with caution or not at all. We have also shown that the use of quiet technology can have a
signiﬁcant effect on the SRMC; the SRMC was reduced to one third and one sixth for the truck
and freight train, respectively, in our example.
The fact that our model is able to differentiate between different vehicles, not only modes of
transport, and even technologies is an important ﬁnding. It is also important that the noise
charges give the operators the right incentives to choose their optimal allocation of noise-
reducing activities. A noise charge that differentiates between not only vehicle types but also
technologies gives the operators incentives to reduce their noise emission to the point when it
is no longer optimal for them to reduce their emission.14 The model presented in this study
differentiates type and technology, area (number and distribution of individuals exposed), and
trafﬁc situation. It can also easily be extended to differentiate day, evening and nighttime emis-
sions in accordance with the LDEN. A more diversiﬁed model is preferred since it better reﬂects
the true SRMC, but it may be too costly to implement since it will require advanced technical
solutions and monitoring to make it work. In the end BCA should decide on the optimal level
of diversiﬁcation of the charges.
Even if the levels of the SRMC are higher for railway than for road vehicles for most of
our vehicle types, the SRMC per passenger and ton is lower. This is mainly explained by the
lower WTP expressed in the valuation functions for rail; the difference in acoustic emissions
per ton/passenger compared to road transport is less important. Note, however, that this paper
assumes that both transport modes on average have a similar degree of utilization (i.e. similar
percentage of empty seats or unloaded freight wagons). The comparisons between total levels
and per passenger and ton of freight show the importance of providing policy makers and
operators with both levels, since it mitigates the risk of different groups trying to inﬂuence the
charges based on non-efﬁcient arguments.
A further issue regarding noise charges in transport is acceptability. Since there are no direct
beneﬁts for the road and railway users from noise charges, their acceptability of such charges
may be low. For instance, congestion charges can reduce travel time, which is a beneﬁt for
those who pay these charges, or charges for maintenance may be accepted if the users believe
that they will be used for actual maintenance. Regarding noise charges, there may not be, or
the users may not believe that there will be, any beneﬁts from paying the charge. To increase
14An alternative for the operators is to use a different route where the SRMC is lower.
20acceptability we believe that differentiated charges according to the above, but also transparent
charges, are necessary. Our model can obtain this and further research should be focused on
determining rules of thumbs for the number of exposed in different areas.
Appendix: Descriptive statistics
[Table 8 about here.]
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Figure 1: Marginal cost pricing and economic efﬁciency







24Figure 3: The effect on the noise level contours when the trafﬁc is increased on the main road. (Source:
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25Table 1: Sound Exposure Level (SEL) calculated per vehicle and unit
Speed Passengers/ SEL at 10 m, dB
Vehicle km/h Freighta per vehicle per unitb
Passenger trafﬁc
Car 110 4 82.1 76.0
Bus 90 50 88.2 71.2
X2 high speed 135 310 98.0 73.1
X14 EMU 135 350 97.0 71.5
X60 EMU 135 370 90.6 64.9
Freight trafﬁc
Truck 90 42 88.2 71.9
Truck (low noise) 90 42 83.1 66.9
Freight train 90 1500 106.9 75.1
F. tr. (K-blocks) 90 1500 98.9 67.1
SEL at a distance of 10 m from emission source (LAE;10m).
a: Metric ton (1,000 kg)
b: Per passenger and metric ton for passenger and freight
trafﬁc, respectively.
Table 2: Regression and noise sensitivity depreciation index (NSDI) results
Regression results NSDI
Variable Coefﬁcient (Std. Err.) Level Road Rail
Living space 0.485*** (0.049) 55 dB 1.35 0.08
Quality index 0.310*** (0.062) 60 dB 1.70 0.28
Terraced -0.315*** (0.025) 65 dB 2.19 1.03











E20 150m -0.012 (0.034)
Dist. station -0.004 (0.029)










Robust standard errors in brackets.
Signiﬁcance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
Subscript j = f1;2g denotes road (1) and rail (2).
kj = ecj=(1+ecj)
NSDI = j(¶P=¶L)(100=P)j
26Table 3: Welfare estimates: SEK/person/year in 2004 price level
Constantsa Change
b k b High Low w/o health w/ health
Road 1 938 866 0.031 0.560 56 55 363 437
66 65 495 569
75 74 654 729
Railway 2 097 665 0.254 0.506 56 55 24 98
66 65 308 382
75 74 3027 3101
a: k and b from Table 2. b-value for road is the value that is used in Eq. (13)
when calculating for railway. and vice versa.
Average exchange rate 2004: USD 1 = SEK 7.35 and EUR 1 = SEK 9.13
(www.riksbank.se, 1/27/11)
Table 4: Marginal change in noise level as a function of distance
Trafﬁc 20 m 50 m 100 m 200 m
Flat 20,000 66.9 56.6 49.0 43.2
ground 16,000 65.9 55.6 48.0 42.2
Diff. 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Screening 20,000 53.1 50.3 46.9 43.5
16,000 52.1 49.4 45.9 42.6
Diff. 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9
Source: Andersson and Ögren (2010)
Table 5: Noise tariffs calculated per vehicle and unit
Speed Passengers/ Tariff, SEK/km
Vehicle km/h Freighta per vehicle per unitb
Passenger trafﬁc
Car 110 4 0.06 0.0148
Bus 90 50 0.24 0.0048
X2 high speed 135 310 0.37 0.0012
X14 EMU 135 350 0.29 0.0008
X60 EMU 135 370 0.07 0.0002
Freight trafﬁc
Truck 90 42 0.24 0.0057
Truck (low noise) 90 42 0.08 0.0018
Freight train 90 1500 2.82 0.0019
F. tr. (K-blocks) 90 1500 0.45 0.0003
SEK price level 2004.
a: Number of passenger and metric ton of freight, respectively.
b: Per passenger and metric ton for passenger and freight
trafﬁc, respectively.
27Table 6: Noise tariffs and parameter variability
Changes as percent and dB
-50% -25% -10% 0 +10% +25% +50%
Parameter -1.8dB -1.0dB -0.4dB 0 +0.4dB +1.0dB +1.8dB
Total trafﬁc volume
Railway 0.988 0.994 0.997 1.000 1.003 1.006 1.011
Road 0.992 0.996 0.998 1.000 1.002 1.004 1.008
Noise level of vehicle
Railway 0.668 0.801 0.910 1.000 1.099 1.248 1.494
Road 0.667 0.800 0.909 1.000 1.100 1.250 1.500
Noise level of ﬂeet
Railway 0.661 0.796 0.907 1.000 1.102 1.256 1.512
Road 0.661 0.796 0.907 1.000 1.102 1.256 1.512
Number of exposed
Railway 0.667 0.800 0.909 1.000 1.100 1.250 1.500
Road 0.667 0.800 0.909 1.000 1.100 1.250 1.500
Railway and Road refer to a 1,500 and a 60 metric ton vehicle, respectively.
Table 7: Noise tariffs and monetary preference estimates
Parameter Reference Railway Road
Including health comp. 1.00 1.87 1.11
Switch val. road/rail 1.00 8.28 0.12
ASEK 4a val. 1.00 7.51 0.91
ASEK 4a (5 dB rail bonus) 1.00 2.21 0.91
Railway and Road refer to a 1,500 and a 60 metric ton
vehicle, respectively.
a: ASEK 4 refers to the ofﬁcial Swedish monetary noise
values (SIKA, 2008).
28Table 8: Descriptive statistics
Variable Description Mean value
Price Property price in thousand SEK and 2004 1917.913
price level (675.549)
Living space Living space in square meters 130.144
(47.606)
Quality index Index of indoor-quality 29.016
(5.517)
Terraced Dummy equals one if terraced house 0.063
Linked - " - if house linked by a garage 0.093
Detached - " - if detached house 0.844
Aspen 1 - " - if <1 km from nearest stn Aspen 0.026
Aspen 2 - " - if 1-2 km from nearest stn Aspen 0.043
Aspedalen 1 - " - if <1 km from nearest stn Aspedalen 0.049
Aspedalen 2 - " - if 1-2 km from nearest stn Aspedalen 0.088
Lerum 1 - " - if <1 km from nearest stn Lerum 0.063
Lerum 2 - " - if 1-2 km from nearest stn Lerum 0.252
Countryside - " - if >2 km from nearest station 0.112
Stenkullen 1 - " - if <1 km from nearest stn Stenkullen 0.019
Stenkullen 2 - " - if 1-2 km from nearest stn Stenkullen 0.067
Floda 1 - " - if <1 km from nearest stn Floda 0.035
Floda 2 - " - if 1-2 km from nearest stn Floda 0.246
E20 150m - " - if within 150 m from motorway 0.136
Dist. station Distance to nearest railway station in km 1.672
(1.320)
Dist. entrance Distance to nearest motorway entrance in km 1.960
(1.005)
Road noise Road noise in dB exceeding 45 dB 7.566
(4.17)
Rail noise Rail noise in dB exceeding 45 dB 3.005
(4.888)
N = 1034
Standard deviations in brackets below mean values. For dummies, std.dev.(x) =
√
¯ x(1  ¯ x).
EUR 1 = SEK 9.13, www.riksbank.se, 9/16/2008
29